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Prior researchers have deployed the Vietnam-era draft lottery as an instrument to estimate causal effects
of military service on health and income.  This research has shown that effects of veteran status on
mortality and earnings that appeared shortly after the war seem to have dissipated by 2000.  While
these are important outcomes to economists, by focusing on them, researchers may be neglecting an
area of life that could be more sensitive to the psychological effects of military service: household
and family life.  In the present study we use the same IV approach to model the causal impact of Vietnam-
era military service on four novel outcomes: residential stability, marital stability, housing tenure and
extended family living arrangements.  In analysis of the 2000 U.S. Census and the 2005 American
Community Survey, we find that veteran status has no effect on housing tenure or residential stability.
However, in the ACS sample, being a veteran appears to lower the likelihood of marital disruption,
and results for extended family living arrangements appear to change signs across the two samples.
 Meanwhile, results tend to be strongest for whites.
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Introduction 
Research into the impact of military service on important health and socio-
economic outcomes has yielded evidence to suggest that veterans differ significantly 
from their non-veteran peers. Though much of the work on veterans has concentrated on 
generations of male veterans from the World War II and Korean War eras, nearly all 
veteran studies, regardless of war-time period, have been plagued by the problem of 
persistent selection bias. Since entry into the military is typically far from random, the 
men represented in the ranks of the armed forces may not be representative of the male 
population as a whole, making identification of a treatment effect of military service 
difficult at best. Specifically, unobserved differences between veterans and non-veterans, 
which are lumped into the error term, may influence substantive outcomes directly 
(educational attainment, mortality, marital stability and so on) and may therefore 
contaminate efforts to estimate a treatment effect of military service or even an intent-to-
treat effect of exposure to conscription.  
In the present study, however, we exploit a natural experiment to estimate the 
effects of Vietnam-era military service on long-term family and household outcomes. 
Between December 1969 and February 1972, the United States Selective Service held 
four Vietnam draft lotteries. Each of these draft lotteries randomly assigned men in 
eligible birth cohorts order of induction numbers through a hand drawing of three 
hundred sixty five birthdates (and 366 for the leap-year lottery for the 1950 birth cohort). 
The draft lottery provides a unique opportunity to utilize the lottery’s random assignment 
method as a ‘natural experiment’ using instrumental variable (IV) estimation.  Building 
on previous work by Angrist (1990) and Angrist and Chen (2008) in this vein, we use   4
data from the 2000 US Decennial Census and the 2005 American Community Survey to 
produce estimates of the average treatment effect of military service on important family 
and residential outcomes in the Vietnam-era military service cohort through an 
instrumental variable estimation. While economists have pursued this same approach to 
estimate military service effects on earnings (Angrist 1991; Angrist and Chen 2008), 
disability status (Angrist and Chen 2008), and mortality (Hearst et al. 1986; Angrist and 
Chen 2008; Conley and Heerwig 2011), they have neglected family and household 
outcomes such at those we model here.  This is an important lacuna since it is reasonable 
to suspect that family live and household structure may be more sensitive to the 
psychological effects of military service than the typical outcomes that have been studied 
thus far.  With this in mind we use a 2SLS estimation approach to model the impact of 
veteran status on marital stability (likelihood of ever having divorced or separated, 
conditional on marriage); household complexity (extended kin co-residence); housing 
tenure (owning versus renting); and residential stability (likelihood of having moved in 
previous five years). 
Previous empirical research on Vietnam veterans has most commonly dealt with 
differences in income between the service and non-service populations. These studies 
have emphasized the uniqueness of the Vietnam-era social and political climate in its 
consequences for veterans. Some have suggested that, in fact, Vietnam service acted as a 
negative screening device in the labor market as Americans reacted to an 
incredibly unpopular war and common conceptions about drug-use among soldiers 
(Angrist, 1991; Ruger, Wilson & Waddoups, 2002; Schwartz, 1986). So, while World 
War II and Korean War veterans were shown to have slight educational and labor market   5
advantages vis-à-vis their non-veteran counterparts (Angrist & Krueger, 1994; Settersten, 
2006; Schwartz, 1986), Vietnam veterans have lagged behind their non-veteran peers. 
The size of the effect of Vietnam military service on income has varied considerably 
among the studies—the differences largely dependent on the method used for 
identification. Teachman (2004), for instance, concludes that there are significant income 
losses for Vietnam veterans of 2.6% using a fixed effects framework. Similarly, Angrist 
(1990) employs an instrumental variable (IV) regression using the draft lottery instrument 
and finds significant earnings losses for the 1950-1952 birth cohorts for years 1969-1984 
among white veterans (although not for nonwhite veterans). A follow-up to Angrist 
(1990) by Angrist and Chen (2008) shows that, by the time of the Decennial Census, the 
“adverse consequences of Vietnam-era military service appear to have faded” (25). 
While studying the impact of military service on income is important, Conley 
(2001a) shows that wealth—specifically in the form of housing wealth, which makes up a 
majority of family equity for the mode of households in the United States—may be a 
crucial “material mechanism by which socio-economic and racial advantage is 
transmitted from one generation to the next.” (264). For example, Conley (1999) shows 
that after parental education, parental wealth level during childhood is the best predictor 
of college enrollment and completion. Conley (2001b) also shows that wealth has an 
analytically distinct effect on educational outcomes beyond the impact of income alone. 
Thus, concentrating on income offers us only a partial picture of the possible material 
disparities generated by military service.  To date, there is only one study that tackles the 
impact of military service on wealth accumulation.  Fitzgerald (2006) uses data from the 
Health and Retirement Study to estimate the impact of military service on wealth   6
accumulation and finds that, for Korea and Vietnam veterans, there is a substantial 
penalty for each additional year of service on total net worth and on non-housing net 
worth. Due to data limitations, however, Fitzgerald’s study is vulnerable to selection bias 
and may be overestimating the military service effect. 
These are important outcomes of study both in their own right and because of 
their potential association with socio-economic or health outcomes both for the veterans 
themselves and their family members (particularly offspring).  For example, recent 
research in urban sociology highlights the possible impact of increased residential 
mobility at both the individual- and community-level. Klinenberg (2003) documents how 
the large-scale out-migration of family members left senior African Americans (primarily 
men) in Chicago’s inner-city vulnerable to heat-related mortality during the 1995 heat 
wave. Sampson (1988; 1991) finds that residential stability significantly increases one’s 
total number of friends / acquaintances, participation in social activities, and 
subsequently, one’s integration into the surrounding community, which may provide 
support in times of need. Yet, little work has been done on the migration pattern of 
Vietnam veterans. Cowper and Longino suggest that “veterans as a whole are more 
mobile and move longer distances than the general population of the same age” (1992, p. 
44), but do not provide information on the Vietnam veteran cohort in particular. Given 
the strong relationship between residential stability and integration into one’s community, 
we might expect increased migration among veterans to negatively influence quality of 
life through social isolation. 
One might also expect that the stresses of military service have a negative impact 
on the duration and health of intimate relationships.  However, Ruger et al. (2002) found   7
that World War II veterans did not have higher marital dissolutions rates than their non-
veteran peers. At the same time, researchers have also shown that the effect of military 
service on marital dissolution likely varies with period of service. For example, Ruger et 
al. (ibid) showed that, when comparing martial stability for World War II veterans with 
veterans of the Korean War, the differences were striking. Korean War veterans had 
“more than twice the dissolution rate of the WWII veterans” (98). The exact reasons for 
the divergence in dissolution rates between veterans of different conflicts are unclear. 
The researchers put forth the “social interaction hypothesis”—the idea that “a social 
milieu” that “a soldier comes home to.…may affect the durability of his marriage” (90). 
If this does indeed turn out to be the explanation for the increased dissolution rates 
among Korean veterans, we would certainly expect that marital dissolution rates among 
Vietnam veterans to be high given the social climate to which these soldiers returned and 
possible ongoing social stigma they may have experienced throughout their lives. 
In addition to modeling these new outcomes, we will also seek to discover 
whether these effects vary by race (c.f. Phillips et al. 1992). There are adequate reasons to 
think that for non-whites any negative effects of draft exposure may be mitigated or even 
reversed.  Angrist (1991), for example, uses the same draft lottery strategy we pursue 
here and finds that there is no earnings penalty for non-white veterans in contrast to the 
15 percent loss in lifetime earnings for white veterans of the Vietnam era. Likewise, with 
respect to health and mortality, London and Wilmoth (2006) use a nationally 
representative longitudinal dataset and find that African Americans without military 
service were more likely to have died than comparable African Americans with no 
military service over a ten-year period. Further, a military service premium for black men   8
does not appear to be limited to earnings and mortality outcomes.  Sampson and Laub 
(1996) find that recruits from economically disadvantaged backgrounds (where blacks are 
overrepresented) benefit from overseas military service on later life indicators of socio-
economic status.  Lundquist (2008) finds that attitudinal measures of job satisfaction also 
reflect the perceived benefits of military life for minority groups. Black men and women 
as well as Latinos and Latinas consistently rank themselves higher on self-reported 
measures of quality of life and job satisfaction than do white males.  However, other 
research has documented that black veterans are more positively selected vis-à-vis their 
non-veteran counterparts than are white veterans (Lundquist 2006) raising the possibility 
that selection may be driving these results (though not Angrist’s). Evading this concern, 
Brown (2006) examines the racial test score gap among the offspring of military 
personnel and finds that among those who are educated on base in military schools, racial 
disparities are significantly smaller than in military offspring sent to local civilian 
schools, lending support to the notion that the mitigation of racial inequalities in the 
military is not merely a consequence of differential selection into the armed forces. The 
current study will further our understanding of whether military service has differential—
and perhaps inequality reducing—effects on blacks and whites net of selection into the 
military. (Death rates during the war itself were similar for blacks and whites, mitigating 
any concerns of differential wartime survival gradients [Rohlfs 2007].) 
Taken together, the proposed analyses provide a comprehensive study of the 
effects—16 to 32 years post-War—of the draft lottery on family and household 
processes.  Understanding the long-term, later-life outcomes that result from military 
service (and/or exposure to risk of conscription) in a time of war is key to designing   9
effective public health and social service interventions for this potentially vulnerable 
population. Conversely, if the treatment reduces risks for some populations (such as 
blacks) then the military deserves to be further investigated as a model for improving the 
family conditions of certain civilian groups such as African Americans. 
Methods 
 
Since for the 1969 draft lottery it has been demonstrated that the lottery was not 
entirely random due to incomplete mixing of the balls that had been pre-sorted by birth 
month (Feinberg 1971), we run a 2SLS model in which we control for a vector (X) that 
includes indicator variables for month (and year) of birth. The first-stage regression (a 
linear probability model) of this 2SLS approach is thus: 
veteranstat* = β0 + β1draftstatus + β2X + ε1     ( 1 )  
Where veteranstat* is coded “1” for having served in the military and “0” otherwise and 
where “draft status” is coded “1” for draft eligible males and “0” for draft ineligible men. 
Next, we estimate the following second stage regression (2).  Both stages deploy a linear 
probability model (as does our “naïve” OLS approach for comparison) even though the 
distribution is not normal for most of our outcomes; Heckman and Macurdy (1985) argue 
that this is the ideal specification when faced with a set of simultaneous equations where 
the instrument, the endogenous regressor, and the dependent measure are dichotomous: 
y  = γ0 + γ 1veteranstat* + γ 2X + u1      ( 2 )  
where “veteranstat*” contains the predicted values generated by the first-stage regression, 
X is our vector of month and year of birth dummies, and y is some outcome of interest. In 
this regression, the coefficient on “veteranstat*” will yield the true or pure effect of 
veteran status on our outcome, if the assumptions we have detailed earlier hold (along   10
with other standard assumptions of IV regression such as monotonicity and SUTVA). 
Other than month of birth, we do not need to include another vector of control variables, 
because our assumption is that draft status will be truly random and thus orthogonal to 
standard socio-demographic variables (at the time of lottery), which we exclude due to 
concerns of endogeneity.  That is, any variation in, say, education or earnings related to 
our instrument would likely be resulting from the treatment.  Thus, we present a reduced 
form equation that will not shed light on the extent to which these behavioral responses 
are moderating or mediating our estimate of veteran status. However, they will be 
interesting in their own right as a summative measure of the effect of exposure to draft 
risk on the outcomes (as opposed to military service per se). 
  The 2000 Decennial Census and American Community Survey 2005 enable us to 
estimate the impact of military service via the draft on a variety of outcomes for the non-
institutionalized population. Both datasets include information on a respondent’s date of 
birth and veteran status. Using the birth date information, we will first code all men in our 
dataset with draft lottery numbers. Next, we will code all men either draft eligible or 
ineligible based on the highest lottery number called to service for that particular draft 
year. The 1953 birth cohort provides a counter-factual to detect the impact of other 
behavioral mechanisms (short of conscription) on our outcomes of interest; these include 
voluntary enlistment in the face of likely conscription as well as mechanisms to evade 
conscription such as through medical decertification, flight from the United States, failure 
to report for induction, conscientious objector status, to name a few. 
Results 
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For each set of outcomes detailed below, the final analyses included two-stage 
least squares estimates of military service (i.e. causal estimates of military service using 
the Vietnam-draft lottery as the instrumental variable) and ordinary least squares 
estimates (i.e. naïve estimates). We also analyzed each outcome by race category. 
Marital Stability: We estimated the effect of military service on the probability of 
divorce conditional on having been married (a comparison of currently married versus 
divorced or separated).  (We also modeled probability of ever marrying; these results 
were not significant and are not shown.)  We begin by describing our “naive” estimates 
given by our OLS models and then proceed to discuss the causal estimates derived from 
the IV regressions.  For our first outcome (everdivorced), we estimate the effect of 
military service on the probability of divorce conditional on having been married. This 
outcome compares those who are currently divorced with the married and separated 
samples, while those who have never been married or are widowed are excluded. In our 
OLS models, the effect of veteran status has a strong and significant effect on the 
probability of divorcing across all race categories. In particular, we find that veteran 
status increases the probability of divorcing by as much as 3% for the full sample. The 
same holds true for a slight variant of our first marital stability outcome (everseparated), 
which includes those who have separated in the “divorced” category. The pattern appears 
in both the Census and ACS samples, although the results for blacks and others in the 
ACS sample are not significant, likely due to the smaller sample size. 
In our instrumental variable models the effect of veteran status disappears in the 
Census sample.  More interestingly, the IV results from the 2005 ACS actually suggest 
that military service reduces the probability of divorce, with the effect concentrated   12
among white veterans. Again, since these estimates use random assignment through the 
draft lottery, the effect is closer to a true causal effect of service on marital stability. It 
should also be noted that, while not significant, the results do also suggest that the 
direction of the effect is opposite for blacks. In other words, military service appears to 
increase the probability of divorce for this population. 
Residential Stability: We estimated the effect of military service on the 
probability of having moved at all in the past five years (both local and long-distance 
moves). Although we had hypothesized that veterans may have significantly different 
migration patterns than the non-service population, our preliminary analyses indicate that, 
in fact, veterans are not more mobile than their non-service peers (as indicated by the 
move variable). For both samples, the OLS estimates indicate a significant positive effect 
for the combined sample. However, this effect once again vanishes in our IV regression 
models for the 2000 Census. For the 2005 ACS, our results mirror those for marital 
stability. The effect changes sign and approaches significance for the total sample, with 
the most pronounced effect being concentrated among whites. For other races, sample 
sizes likely inhibit detection of an effect of military service on residential stability. 
Housing Tenure: A third analysis highlighted the potential effect of military 
service on the probability of owning the primary residence home versus renting.  Since 
homeownership among the veteran population has been heavily subsidized by 
government programs such as the VA-Home Loan Program, this outcome has direct 
implications for the evaluation of existing policies. As such, we compare men who own 
their homes outright or with a mortgage with those who rent or do not pay rent 
(ownshome).  (If we restrict the analysis to heads of households, results do not change.)    13
For both the Census and the ACS, our OLS models indicate that veteran status reduces 
the probability of owning one's home. These effects are, again, concentrated among white 
veterans (where our sample sizes are largest). In the IV models, however, the effect of 
military service diminishes and no longer reaches statistical significance for the race 
categories combined or separately. Given the vast subsidies to homeownership granted to 
veterans, it is instructive that our OLS models are negative—suggesting that the service 
population is still less likely to own a home—while our IV models suggest no causal 
effect. In either case, it appears that these subsidies have not worked to boost 
homeownership rates for veterans above the non-service population, although it could be 
that, without such subsidies, veterans might lag far behind. 
Extended Family Living: As another indicator of financial or family instability, 
we also modeled several novel outcomes that would shed light on the living situations of 
the Vietnam-era population as it ages. In particular, we modeled the probability of living 
with a non-spouse relative (including a parent, child, uncle, aunt, and so on). In addition, 
we also modeled the probability of having an adult child (over the age of twenty-two) in 
the residence, for Vietnam eligible males who were also heads-of-household (thus the 
smaller sample size for this analysis given the restriction to heads-of-household).  
These models yielded some of the most intriguing findings. For the extended 
family living outcome (withfamily), our OLS results suggest that, for the total sample, 
veteran status reduces the probability of living with a non-spouse family member. The 
effect is the same, although smaller, in the IV models. The effect, once again, appears to 
be concentrated among whites, although the direction of the effect is the same for blacks.   14
For others, however, the 2005 ACS results indicate that military service significantly 
increases the probability of living in an extended family household. 
Similar patterns emerge for the adult child (kidhome) outcome. This measures 
something different than extended family residence since it may capture intergenerational 
effects on SES attainment.  Failure to leave the parental home in young adulthood in a 
culture like that in the U.S. is seen in life course research as an indicator of poor 
education or labor market outcomes.  While the OLS estimates for the 2000 Census 
suggest that military service may increase the chances of having an adult child in the 
household, the IV results show the opposite valence, suggesting a significant decrease in 
this probability. For the Census models, this effect is once again concentrated among 
whites, although the sign on the veteran status instrument is the same for blacks. In the 
2005 ACS, we find further evidence that the effect of military service differs by race—
for “others”, we find that military service increases the probability of having an adult 
child in the household quite significantly—by 36 percentage points. 
Discussion 
  
Prior researchers have deployed the Vietnam-era draft lottery as an instrument to 
estimate causal effects of military service on health and income.  This research has shown 
that effects of veteran status on mortality and earnings that appeared shortly after the war 
seem to have dissipated by 2000.  While these are important outcomes to economists, by 
focusing on them, researchers may be neglecting an area of life that could be more 
sensitive to the psychological effects of military service: household and family life.  In 
the present study we use the same IV approach to model the causal impact of Vietnam-
era military service on four novel outcomes: residential stability, marital stability, 
housing tenure and extended family living arrangements.  In analysis of the 2000 U.S.   15
Census and the 2005 American Community Survey, we find that veteran status has no 
effect on housing tenure or residential stability. However, in the ACS sample, being a 
veteran appears to lower the likelihood of marital disruption.  And results for extended 
family living arrangements appear to change signs across the two samples.  Meanwhile, 
results tend to be strongest for whites. 
While we did demonstrate that there appear to be some—if limited—long term 
effects of Vietnam era military service, these are modest at best, in line with an emerging 
picture of dissipating effects 25 years plus after the end of combat.  The most pronounced 
effect is the decreased likelihood for white veterans to move, divorce or separate in the 
2005 ACS sample (though not in the 2000 Census).  This suggests a potentially positive 
effect of military conscription on family and residential stability for this group that may 
or may not be mediated by education (or military service directly).  Most puzzling is the 
different results that we obtain for the two samples: Besides residential and marital 
stability, the effect of extended kin residence is, in fact, opposite (and significantly so) in 
each sample.  In the 2000 Census, the effect is negative for both having an adult child 
living at home as well as for living with other extended kin.  However, in the 2005 ACS, 
the IV results are positive for adult child living at home; and for “other race” the 
coefficient is particularly strong (.36) for this outcome as well as for extended family co-
residence (.22).  These differences across samples may be a result of different points in 
the business cycle or may be due to random fluctuation or may represent the result of 
aging populations.  Future researchers should examine future ACS samples to determine 
whether or not effects shown in 2005 are sampling artifacts or emerging trends.  16
Table 1:  Descriptive statistics for 2000 Census sample, 1950-1952 birth cohorts by race category 
 

















Draft  Eligible  0.33 0.53 0.32 0.54 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.49 
0-8  Years  0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.03 
9-12  Years  0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.10 0.14 0.08 
H.S.  Graduate  0.27 0.33 0.26 0.34 0.33 0.31 0.27 0.29 
Some  College  0.22 0.30 0.23 0.30 0.20 0.35 0.23 0.33 
Associate’s  0.07 0.11 0.07 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.12 
Bachelor’s  0.20 0.12 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 
College+  0.13 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.05 
Earnings 44154.97 37058.08 46416.62 38257.96 26925.01 28681.93 32164.52 30236.76 
          
withfamily  0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.07 
moved  0.30 0.35 0.30 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.40 
ownshome  0.83 0.81 0.85 0.83 0.65 0.66 0.72 0.70 
N  593725 187345 519160 162565  53450  16740  21115  8045 
          
kidhome  0.10 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
N  537695 171365 478095 150425  41795  13880  17810  7065 
          
 everdivorced  0.17 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.24 
 everseparated  0.19 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.32 0.33 0.25 0.28 
N  525935 173050 466330 151470  41845  14365  17760  7215 
Note:  All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with Census confidentiality guidelines.  
Proportions are calculated with rounded sample sizes.   17
 
Table 2:  Descriptive statistics for 2005 ACS sample, 1950-1952 birth cohorts by race category 
 

















Draft Eligible  0.33  0.54  0.33 0.55 0.34 0.50 0.32 0.51 
0-8 Years  0.02  0.01  0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.02 
9-12 Years  0.07  0.05  0.06 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.06 
H.S. Graduate  0.26  0.33  0.26 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.28 0.31 
Some College  0.21  0.29  0.21 0.28 0.20 0.32 0.22 0.29 
Associate’s  0.07  0.12  0.07 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.15 
Bachelor’s  0.21  0.13  0.22 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.11 
College+  0.15  0.07  0.16 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.07 
Earnings  49562.2 39260.7 51661.91 40637.28 28573.03 26335.77 35358.26 31628.05 
            
withfamily  0.04  0.03  0.03 0.03 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.05 
moved  0.06  0.08  0.06 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.10 
ownshome  0.87  0.86  0.89 0.87 0.69 0.69 0.79 0.77 
N 61060  18720  54960  16655 4250  1350  1850  710 
            
kidhome  0.12  0.12  0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.14 
N  56590 17555 51455  15725  3515  1190  1615  640 
            
everdivorced  0.16  0.18  0.16 0.17 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.25 
everseparated  0.18  0.20  0.17 0.19 0.31 0.32 0.25 0.28 
N  54410 17315 49460  15500  3350  1175  1600  645 
Note:  All sample sizes are rounded in accordance with Census confidentiality guidelines.  
Proportions are calculated with rounded sample sizes. 
 
Table 3:  Military service effect estimates on extended family living, home ownership, marital 
stability and residential stability using 2000 Census data for 1950-1952 birth cohorts only by race  
 
  All White  Black  Other 
Outcome  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
















          
















          
















          
















          
















          
















*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 ; Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  All models include controls 
for state of birth and birth cohort.     18
 
Table 4: Military service effect estimates on extended family living, home ownership, marital 
stability and residential stability using 2005 ACS data for 1950-1952 birth cohorts only by race  
 
  All White  Black  Other 
Outcome  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
kidhome  -0.003      
0.003 
0.028*     













           
withfamily  -0.009***   
0.002 
 0.010     













          
ownshome  -0.020***   
0.003 














          
moved  0.015***   
0.002 
0.005     





-0.008      
0.009      
0.051 
0.073 
0.010      
0.013      
-0.009    
0.082 
          
everdivorced  0.015***   
0.003 
-0.033*     













          
everseparated   0.018***   
0.003 
-0.044**    














*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Note:  Standard errors in parentheses.  All models include controls 
for state of birth and birth cohort.     19
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